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Abstract 
 
The practices of Network Defense were analyzed in this research paper.  The Internet has 
become a very dangerous place for computer systems and networks as an increasing number of 
malicious attacks are occurring each day. Attacks such as Phishing, Campaign Style Attacks, 
Zero Day Exploits, and Botnets are plaguing individuals and firms who are concerned for the 
protection of their data and systems.  By utilizing a combination of defense systems including 
Firewalls, Intrusion Protection Systems, 802.1x, NAC, Antivirus, Antispyware and more, I have 
developed a comprehensive system which can be used as a model of Network Security.  In 
conclusion there many firms that are not ready for Network Security in today’s computer world.  
With the question of economics needed to remediate the issue, there is the question on how 
secure are companies and individuals going to be. 
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Introduction 
 
The world has changed dramatically since the Internet began with ARPANET as an 
extended military network, in the late 1960’s.  In the mid-1990’s, we saw the advent of web 
browsers and the mainstream adoption of personal computers.  Today, almost every electronic 
device is capable of connecting to the Internet, placing infinite amounts of information at our 
fingertips.  The Internet has even revolutionized the process of writing a thesis compared to my 
undergraduate days when I would spend countless hours in the library performing manual 
research through card catalogs, books, and periodicals.  In performing the research necessary to 
write this thesis, I have yet to set foot in a public or university library or even to leave my house.  
The amount of information that can be discovered and accessed on the Internet is truly 
staggering, and the potential benefits seem infinite. 
 
With so much information so easily accessible, a new challenge arises:  How do we keep 
sensitive and private data safe in an Internet-enabled world designed to allow you to find and 
access anything and everything?  Some people may wonder about the safety of their data or the 
security of the network on which it resides.  Many more probably do not think about Internet 
safety at all.  Many users on corporate networks assume that adequate security measures are in 
place and that the IT Professionals supporting their networks are looking out for their best 
interests.  The main fallacy with these assumptions is that the Internet was not designed with 
security or access restrictions in mind.  In order to protect and maintain the security of a network 
and the data behind it, each individual and company needs to have an active and mitigating 
defense plan, ready to adjust to any threat it may face.  
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Background 
 
Network Security has really been only focused on the technology itself and has forgotten 
the people, policy, and processes needed to make the infrastructure as solid as possible.  For 
many companies, security is an afterthought rather than something that needs to be considered an 
integral part of the initial IT infrastructure and to the ongoing upkeep of those systems which 
help protect all new products from harm.1 Today’s new priority is to deliver an application and 
have it accessible from anywhere at any time.  However, the application developers often do not 
consider the associated security implications related to the design and implementation of the 
application.  More and more businesses are delivering Internet-accessible applications to the 
public without integrating security into their final products or even into their development cycle.2  
The costs associated with each security breach, including additional labor hours needed to repair 
the systems, potential theft of proprietary data, and loss of customers due to the company’s 
failure to provide adequate security, can add up to $6.63 million on average.3   
Currently, over 120 countries exploit the Internet in order to conduct malicious acts 
against individuals and businesses alike.  Many of them don’t even need to develop their own 
technique; they can buy already functional tools which are widely available on hacker web sites 
to attack other systems.4  According to Cisco Corporation, spam messages make up over 90% of 
the world’s email with over 200 billion unsolicited emails delivered each day.  The United States 
accounts for over 17% of this traffic.5  While much of this spam originates as attempts to add 
users to a product sales database, a large percentage of spam messages use the Internet as a 
                                                 
1
 IT security professionals must evolve for changing market, retrieved 1/10/2009, retrieved from http://www.scmagazineus.com/IT-security-
professionals-must-evolve-for-changing-market/article/33990/ 
2
 Computer Security in an Insecure World, retrieved 1/21/2009, retrieved from http://www.cio-
today.com/story.xhtml?story_id=0030003Q2MPC&page=1 
3
 Data Breach Costs Rose Significantly In 2008, Ponemon Study Says, retrieved 2/8/09, retrieved from 
http://www.darkreading.com/security/attacks/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=213000466&cid=RSSfeed 
4
 Cyber Crime: A 24/7 Global Battle, retrieved 2/4/2009, retrieved from http://www.mcafee.com/us/research/criminology_report/default.html 
5
 Cisco Report Spotlights Worldwide Cyber Security Threats, retrieved 2/2/2009, retrieved from 
http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2008/prod_121508.html 
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means of deploying viruses, worms, and other exploits to unsuspecting mail readers. In addition, 
spam is becoming harder and harder to identify as “phishers” customize their attacks so that the 
messages appear to be from someone that the victim would know.  The victim is then more likely 
to activate the link or program embedded in the email.6 
Thesis Objective 
 
There are many new attacks being devised on the Internet, so we need to start looking at 
Network Security as an integral part of the necessary infrastructure to allow a company to 
function in today’s business world. When designing their network architecture, each company 
needs to identify all possible vulnerabilities which might pose risk and exposure to a firm’s 
proprietary information.  The diagram below represents a staple design of the network defense in 
the past. 
7
 
However, this design focuses solely on the network perimeter, ignoring other potentially 
vulnerable components of the overall architecture.  The perimeter represents only one layer of 
                                                 
6
 Cisco Report Spotlights Worldwide Cyber Security Threats, retrieved 2/2/2009, retrieved from 
http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2008/prod_121508.html 
 
7
 Redefining your perimeter with MPLS-an integrated network solution, retrieved 2/13/2009, retrieved from 
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/firewalls/redefining_your_perimeter_with_mpls_an_integrated_network_solution_1811 
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network defense.  If that layer is breached, attackers could still exploit vulnerabilities in the 
internal systems to infiltrate and compromise the network.   
When designing an overall security plan, the phrase “Defense in depth” should be 
foremost in the mind of the engineer, realizing that no one solution will be able to protect all 
facets of the network.  In addition to the traditional focus on Perimeter Security, engineers 
should consider additional security tools, such as Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Protection 
Systems (IDS and IPS), Virtual Private Networks (VPN), Network Admission Control (NAC), 
Proxies, Extranets, Two-Factor Authentication, and Wireless Networks (Wi-Fi).   
 
8
 
 
Many companies are also shifting to a mobile workforce model, and connecting mobile 
users with a firm’s internal systems presents additional security challenges:  Are these users 
connecting to the network from computing assets owned and managed by the corporation or are 
they connecting via personally owned assets that are outside the control of the Network Security 
team?  Are these users trying to authenticate to the system in a safe and secure fashion?  
                                                 
8
 Redefining your perimeter with MPLS-an integrated network solution, retrieved 2/13/2009, retrieved from 
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/firewalls/redefining_your_perimeter_with_mpls_an_integrated_net
work_solution_1811 
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 During the course of this paper, I plan to explore some of the issues that face Network 
Security professionals and assess the state of the Network Security industry as a whole.  We will 
first discuss the origins of the Internet and offer some theories as to why the Internet seems to 
have been designed without security in mind.  Next, we will examine the circumstances 
surrounding several different historic network attacks, and discuss the evolution of these types of 
attacks from individual hackers playing pranks to full campaigns of corporate espionage and 
sabotage.  We will then look at some of the types of products and network architectures that can 
help mitigate some of the risk that companies face and weigh the merits of these solutions.  I will 
then propose my design for a state-of-the-art secure network, highlighting the common practices 
and policies that will be needed to ensure that the design is a long-term solution.  Admittedly, the 
tools and methods outlined in this design might prove cost-prohibitive to many companies.  
However, considering the equally high costs associated with network security breaches, for the 
purpose of this thesis, I will assume that budget is not an issue.  Finally, I will assess the current 
state of the Network Security Industry and make several recommendations for improvement. 
 
The History of the Internet and the Advent of Network Security 
 
 Computer systems have evolved substantially over the course of the last fifty-plus years.  
“Computer Networking” was a completely foreign concept to everyone until 1962, when J.C.R. 
Licklider of MIT first described the architecture in his discussion of the “Galactic Network” 
concept.  Licklider was the head of the computer research program for Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and was able to convince his other colleagues that 
networking would be the direction of the future.  It took some time for the development of packet 
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switching, but in 1969, the first host computer using Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) was attached to the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
(ARPANET), and the Internet as we know it today was born.  As ARPANET began to expand to 
academic institutions, government agencies, and defense companies, the need for security was 
never considered.  All of the scientists knew one another, and they had a sense of community and 
mutual trust and respect.  The whole point of computer networking was to share information in 
an open way.  In addition, most of the computers that were attached to ARPANET were a series 
of mainframes, pre-dating the client/server model and the capabilities of multitasking processors 
of today.  There was no perceived threat, so there was need to consider security. 9 
 
10
 
This is a picture of what the ARPANET looked like, in 1980.   At the time, there were fewer than 
200 computers that were connected across the United States.  However, during the early part of 
the 1980’s, personal computers were becoming more commonplace and local area networks 
(LANs) were being developed.     The small, intimate community of ARPANET was growing 
                                                 
9
 A brief history of the Internet, retrieved 2/15/09, retrieved from http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml 
 
10
 From ARPANET to World Wide Web, retrieved 2/16/09, retrieved from 
http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/ivh/chap2.htm 
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into a city of strangers.  In a 10 year period from 1977 to 1987, the number of hosts that were on 
the “Internet” jumped substantially from 111 hosts to over 10,000.11 Due to the alarming increase 
in hosts being added to the network, the government proceeded in developing a set of guidelines 
called the “Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria.”  Unfortunately, while this may have 
been one of the first documented Network Security manuals to be released, the guidelines were 
developed for standalone machines, and they did not address the potential threat of being 
connected to thousands of other devices.   
 
On November 2, 1988, the world of networking and the way that companies would have 
to think about security changed radically with the introduction of the “Morris” Virus.  Robert 
Morris, a 23 year old programmer, developed a worm that quickly spread throughout the 
ARPANET network completely unchecked.  The worm affected over 6,000 machines by 
flooding the computer’s memory and replicating infinite copies of itself, creating a Denial of 
Service attack, and thus forcing the machine to stall.  This single worm held 60% of the 
ARPANET network hostage for two days.   No one had ever seen an attack like this before, so 
no one was prepared.12  The age of Network Security and Cyber Attacks might call this “Day 1.” 
Internet Attacks – Understanding the Threat 
 
While the first attack was the “Morris” worm on November 2, 198813, there have been 
many more dangerous virus and worm attacks that have affected machines all over the Internet.  
In 1999, the “Melissa” virus struck, and virtually thousands of computers were infected 
                                                 
11
 Internet History and Growth, retrieved 2/15/09, retrieved from http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/ 
 
12
 Blaming Microsoft, retrieved 2/16/09, retrieved from http://antivirus.about.com/cs/allabout/a/msvsham.htm 
 
13
 Internet History and Growth, retrieved 2/15/09, retrieved from http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/ 
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overnight.  This virus would replicate itself by sending an infected email from Microsoft Outlook 
to the first 50 users on a victim’s Address Book.  It would then infect Microsoft Word documents 
on each PC it attacked.  Once a computer was infected, the virus would continue to spread as the 
different documents on the machine became infected and were passed onto unsuspecting victims 
as email attachments.  This single attack caused quite a commotion, setting a record at the time 
of over $80 million in damage and creating demand for anti-virus software as many consumers 
attempted to keep their machines safe.   
 
In 2000, the “I Love You” virus, which was distributed similarly to the “Melissa” virus, 
crippled millions of computers in the blink of an eye.  Interestingly, this virus was created in the 
Philippines, a country with no laws regarding cyber terrorism.  As a result, the European Union 
and the United States instituted the Global Cybercrime Treaty which was developed to 
encourage governments and private enterprises within a country to work together to combat 
cyber terror.14  By participating in this treaty, anyone within that country who violated these 
cyber crime statues would be subject to similar laws and penalties. 
 
Many serious viruses have evolved since the development of “Melissa” and “I Love 
You,” such as “Code Red,” “Blaster,” and “Nachi.”  “Code Red” would attempt to use TCP port 
80 to copy itself onto a user’s machine.  Once copied onto the machine, the code would attack 
and overload the system’s memory by sending the character “N” to the system an infinite 
number of times, creating a denial of service attack.  Once the denial of service attack started, the 
virus could then insert its package, infecting the system, and since the memory was overloaded, 
                                                 
14
 A Short History of Computer Viruses and Attacks, retrieved 2/24/09, retrieved from 
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/2445 
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there would be no way to track the change. Once infected, that machine would contact and 
attempt to copy the virus code to another machine on TCP port 80, thus perpetuating the attack.  
Copied below is an example of code that would have indicated that the “Code Red” Virus had 
attempted to attack a system, but had not necessarily infected the given machine.15   
/default.ida?NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN 
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN 
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN 
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3% 
u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531 
b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a  
  
 “Blaster” exploited a Microsoft buffer overflow vulnerability (which was resolved in 
Microsoft Patch MS03-026 and MS03-039) and targeted machines which had not received the 
patch.  As soon at the machine was infected, the virus would try to infect other machines using a 
new attack strategy which exploited a known vulnerability in the Windows DCOM RPC service.   
Once a system was infected, it would join other infected computers to create a denial of service 
attack against the Windows Update page (http://windowsupdate.com).16  By attacking the 
Windows Update page, the virus prevented other potential victims from being able to download 
the patch and protect their machines.  Ironically, “the cure for the ‘Blaster’ virus” turned out to 
be more dangerous than “Blaster” itself.  “Nachi” would infect computers that were 
compromised with the “Blaster” virus and direct them to the Microsoft Update page to obtain the 
patch for the first vulnerability.  The unfortunate side effect of this exploit was that systems 
infected with “Nachi” would then ping all systems on the local network trying to find other 
“broken” machines, causing a denial of service attack on a company’s entire infrastructure.  
While working as a system administrator on a network fighting this virus, I noticed that an 
                                                 
15
 CERT® Advisory CA-2001-19 "Code Red" Worm Exploiting Buffer Overflow In IIS Indexing Service DLL, 
retrieved 5/2/2009, retrieved from http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html 
 
16
 Top Ten Most Destructive Computer Viruses of All Time, retrieved 5/2/2009, retrieved from 
http://crunkish.com/top-ten-worst-computer-viruses/ 
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individual machine could cripple an entire subnet unless I implemented a router Access Control 
List to specifically isolate the infected machines from the rest of the infrastructure.  Once the 
device was quarantined from the rest of the subnet, we could find and repair it properly before 
connecting it back to the rest of the network.17 
Attacks of Today 
 Viruses are being developed and released “into the wild” at an alarming rate.  
Previously, system administrators and the user public would receive warnings several weeks in 
advance to the release of a potential upcoming virus.  In today’s world, there is almost no 
warning, which can be attributed to the development of tools for attackers and to the 
collaboration of various attackers to reach a common goal.  In some cases, the exploit and virus 
are being released that same day, which is known as a zero day exploit.  Zero day exploits    are 
often viruses written to take advantage of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office applications where 
a crafted file could be used to infect other systems prior to a patch being released.  An infected 
file could victimize multiple machines without anyone knowing there was a vulnerability being 
passed from user to user.   
 
Advanced notification of vulnerabilities can be a double-edged sword.  On the second 
Tuesday of the month, Microsoft announces their newly discovered vulnerabilities and the 
associated patches, forcing diligent system administrators to make sure that any critical patches 
are installed quickly to guard again potential exploits.  At the same time, attackers have the 
opportunity to write viruses targeting these vulnerabilities in the event that an organization is not 
aware of the new threat.   
                                                 
17
 The history of viruses and worms, retrieved 3/1/09, retrieved from http://vx.netlux.org/lib/atc01.html 
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Email viruses are extremely common in today’s world, often propagated via SPAM, 
Spear phishing, and Trojan horse programs.  Spear Phishing is a directed message to a specific 
individual which takes the look and feel of a message sent by someone the victim might know, 
making the message seem more credible.  SPAM and Spear Phishing emails both typically 
include a link to an unknown and potentially dangerous website.   Before clicking the link, users 
ought to ask themselves, “How well do I know the user in question?” and “Why would that user 
be sending that subject of email to me?”  In many cases with Spear Phishing, the person who 
seems to have sent the email is actually a victim of Spoofing.   In this type of attack, a user on 
the Internet masquerades as another person and sends messages on behalf of that person in an 
attempt to appear legitimate and infect the recipients’ machines, like the proverbial “wolf in 
sheep’s clothing.”  Trojan horse programs usually hide in email file attachments that look 
innocent but have a hidden message inside them that can cause havoc on the network.  For 
example, an attacker might send an email containing pictures of tributes to fallen soldiers.  
Figuring that such an email would appeal to the patriotic emotions of many US citizens, they 
would open the picture and unsuspectingly install the Trojan horse.  Trojan horses are capable of 
utilizing various types of tools in their payload, such as keystroke loggers, programs that capture 
all text that is typed with the intent of stealing passwords and other sensitive information and 
sending it back to a remote destination.   Trojan horses can also turn a machine into a zombie 
where the user has little to no control of the system or even into a remote administration tool 
(RAT) that the attacker would access at a later time to be able to remotely compromise other 
systems within the environment.  Not only are Trojan horse attacks getting more and more 
advanced every day, but also the attackers are using social espionage, targeting and isolating 
their potential victims at conferences or through Help Wanted ads. “One targeted Trojan was 
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sent to five employees at one company--every single person was a member of the firm's research 
and development team.”18   
  
In addition to viruses, there are many other types of attacks that are in the computing 
world.  As also found in the kinetic or traditional type military, there is reconnaissance and 
intelligence that can be acquired through different methods of scanning IT networks in a type of 
virtual warfare.  Although considered fairly amateur, attackers might use “Script Kiddies” to 
scan networks.  Readily available for purchase on the Internet, these programs are a series of 
tools written to discover weaknesses in a company’s perimeter network.  In these cases, the 
attacker only knows how to run the specific program and in most cases does not know how to 
break into the computer systems even if some are exposed.  Another more advanced way of 
scanning for network vulnerabilities is through a technique called “Footprinting.”  In this 
technique, the attacker users a series of different programs to create a roadmap of a company 
network so they can determine the types of applications being run, the operating systems in use, 
the ports that are open, and possibly the IP ranges and scheme being utilized.  Port scanning is 
used when the attacker attempts to see on which ports a computer system responds, thus finding 
out what ports might be open to exploits.  An attacker might also use an “Enumeration” 
technique to discover the applications running and the user accounts that happen to be on that 
system at the given time.  By knowing what applications are running, attackers can target 
specific vulnerabilities in those programs to gain access to the computer.  Once he has identified 
the valid user accounts on the system, the attacker can use password cracking tools to gain 
entrance to the system unnoticed as a valid user of the system.  Once they have access, attackers 
                                                 
18Targeted Trojan attacks on the rise, retrieved 4/14/09, retrieved from  http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11418/1 
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may also run programs in order to elevate their credentials to be able to run any type of program 
on the compromised system.19 20 21  
 
Social Engineering 
 Social Engineering is not a new type of attack, but it is becoming more common in the IT 
world today.  Social Engineering in IT occurs when one or more persons inside a company steal 
or destroy data or assets for personal gain or on behalf of an external company or entity.  One 
might consider this a modern day version of Cold War espionage as malicious employees or 
contractors inside a firm’s walls try to acquire proprietary information or introduce exploits into 
the network from within the company’s IT defenses.  In some cases, a user may try to take 
advantage of the rights and privileges that they possess in order to acquire information and then 
sell it to a competitor for personal profit.  Other disgruntled employees might try to exploit 
something on the company network to cause a disruption of service.  The prevalence of USB 
devices has added another security threat to the workplace, especially in classified areas, where 
vast amounts of information could be compromised.  One trend of late is to make jewelry that 
has built in USB devices, making it very difficult to see that someone has a device capable of 
stealing mass quantities of information.22  In addition, when Dark Reading, one of the premier 
online resources available to Security Professionals, was asked to assess the network of a credit 
                                                 
19
 Network Attack and Defense, retrieved 3/1/09, retrieved from http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SE-18.pdf 
 
20
 Network Attacks, retrieved 3/1/09, retrieved from http://nsrc.org/workshops/2008/ait-wireless/kemp/network-
attacks.pdf 
 
21
 Network Attacks Review, retrieved 3/1/09, retrieved from http://www.tech-faq.com/responding-to-network-
attacks-and-security-incidents.shtml 
 
22
 The hot trend in designer jewelry: USB keys, retrieved 4/1/09, retrieved from http://news.cnet.com/8301-
17938_105-9728324-1.html 
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union, they planted various USB devices which contained Trojan horse programs around the 
office to see what would happen.  As the auditors of Dark Reading suspected, they discovered 15 
of the 20 USB devices plugged into the company network, and all of the Trojans on the devices 
had infected and then spread to other machines.23  This was only a test, but it demonstrates how 
easy it was to infiltrate the company defenses. 
 
Major Concerns of Attacks Today 
Some of the attacks that are posing the greatest concern to system administrators right 
now and are increasing in frequency are Botnets, attacks on Voice over IP systems, Peer to Peer 
network attacks, attacks on Wireless systems, and campaign-style attacks.  Botnets are slave or 
zombie computers that are under constant control of the “herder” or hacker in charge, and are 
used to infiltrate other systems across the Internet that work in conjunction to spread Spam, 
malware, or adware across the Internet or illegal Peer to Peer type music sharing sites.    In the 
picture below, the virus writer attacks a group of unprotected Windows machines and forces 
them to become Botnets and work for the writer or hacker.  
 
                                                 
23
 Social Engineering, the USB way, retrieved 4/23/09, retrieved from 
http://www.darkreading.com/security/perimeter/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=208803634 
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The Botnet computers then utilize the web and connect to a site where multiple people 
can be infected such as a chat board or a Peer to Peer network.  The spammer then uses the virus 
written program to force the Botnets to push out their spam all over the Internet.  In a recent 
survey conducted by Symantec Corporation, one of the largest distributors of home firewalls, 
over 90% of the respondents said that they had some type of antivirus software installed on their 
computer.  When Symantec further probed these respondents, only 42% also had a personal 
firewall enabled and installed.24 25  
 
Voice over IP (VoIP) systems and hybrid Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) /VoIP 
systems are becoming commonplace in the replacement of many of the traditional Public Branch 
Exchanges (PBX’s) and there is a question of security when these different types of systems 
transmit to the rest of the Internet which is not a concern with Traditional PBX’s.  A PBX is a 
private entities’ telephone system which connects that firm to the rest of the global telephone 
network (PSTN). When a firm merges their data and voice networks together, the chance of a 
denial of service for one network would also affect all of the enterprise’s telecommunications 
systems.   Another target for a VoIP system would be to compromise the signaling server, as an 
attacker would know the destinations of the phone calls, which could be more harmful than 
knowing what the actual communication itself said.  By virtue of knowing where valid traffic 
was supposed to go, a hacker could masquerade as the destination and the source might believe 
                                                 
24Many computer users lack basic security precautions, survey says, retrieved February 2, 2009, retrieved from 
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9116083 
 
25
 File:Zombie-process, retrieved 4/12/09, retrieve from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Zombie-process.svg 
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that a valid conversation is trying to occur.  Finally, an intruder could redirect the VoIP packets 
that were destined for the recipient and have them routed to themselves.  While it might take 
some skill for the attacker to be able to recode the packets and understand the conversation, it 
could conceivably be done.  In order for these types of attacks to happen on the legacy PSTN, it 
would require the attackers to have a significant amount of both logical and physical access to 
the old fashioned telephone network, for instance somewhere in one of the Ma Bell branches 
which would be fairly difficult to accomplish.26 
  
Peer to Peer networks, which are commonly known for chat and illegal downloading of 
music, continue to pose a mainstream threat.  For instance, in February of 2009, a person 
working on a computer containing documents with the blue prints to the Marine One helicopter 
downloaded and installed a file sharing program such as Limewire, and attackers with IP 
Addresses originating in Iran were able to remotely access the machine.  By a client loading this 
software, attackers were able to gather sensitive data and had the ability to poison or destroy 
other data on the machine.27  Wireless networks both at home and at hotspots in cafes and other 
public places are also prime targets for hackers.  When consumers purchase wireless access 
points for their homes, the devices come out of the box with a default setting that allows anyone 
to connect to their wireless network.  With an open network, there is a greater possibility that a 
hacker could get into sensitive data on your machine, or masquerade as your IP address across 
the Internet.  In addition, older home routers may still be configured with the old Wired 
Equivalency Privacy standard (WEP), and may not be updated for the Wi-Fi Protected Access 
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WPA or WPA2 standard.  These older routers could be vulnerable as the older standard has been 
compromised and is no longer deemed secure.28  One thing to remember when using either WEP 
or WPA is that the encryption is established between the router and the laptop, and that all 
packets sent by the router to the Internet are in clear text.  In a hotspot, all of the information sent 
is also in clear text where it could be easily compromised from unsuspecting users.  Wireless 
sniffer tools such as Airsnort can monitor passive communications and eventually decipher the 
encryption code that is being sent.  This could mean that even though a user was going through a 
HTTPS site, a hacker could steal sensitive information such as credit card data, bank 
information, or passwords to email accounts or other systems.29  
  
Campaign-style attacks are a new threat from the world of military tactics that is getting a 
lot of visibility.  During the Summer Olympic Games, there was commentary during the Opening 
Ceremonies between the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President George W. Bush 
regarding the Russian invasion of the Republic of Georgia.  While the Russian military had not 
physically moved into Georgia until August, 2008, a coordinated Denial of Service Internet 
attack had already occurred against the entire Georgian Infrastructure, which limited the ability 
for the Georgian government to share information.  These attacks have been traced back to July 
20, 2008, and not only prevented communications from the Georgian government to the 
Georgian people, but also prevented sympathizers of the Georgia cause to be alerted of the 
situation.  This attack also forced the President of Georgia’s webpage to be re-hosted outside of 
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the country and in the United States in order to help preserve the flow of information to his 
people.3031  
 
Some users might ask the question, “So why are individuals and businesses being 
attacked in the first place?”, “Can’t the attackers in question be punished?” and “What is their 
motivation?”  Since most attacks originate in other countries and no international task force has 
been established, many crimes can frequently go unpunished.  Many attackers are motivated by 
greed, trying to steal the information and sell it to other businesses or countries for profit.  If 
unsuspecting users don’t protect their computers or think before they click on links in emails and 
get redirected to a fake site, they could be putting personal or sensitive information directly into 
the hands of an attacker.  Some attackers are only interested in infamy; creating viruses and 
worms for the sole purpose of crippling the Internet and thus establishing their superiority.  Some 
users steal or alter information for the sole purpose of Industrial Espionage and may be 
compensated by other firms or nations for this work.  The Chinese government has been given a 
good deal of criticism for using these techniques since the Internet’s infancy.  The thought 
process is that it is much cheaper to steal information than try to invent it themselves.32   
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Tools to Defend the Enterprise and How We Can Fight Back 
Firewalls 
 The most well known of the IT security solutions is the firewall, used to separate a 
company’s internal networks from the rest of the Internet, and is now the most widely accepted 
tool in the marketplace.  The firewall itself has become the “solution in the box” for many 
companies, acting as the single entry point into the network and giving the firm the ability to 
filter the different types of traffic that are allowed from untrusted, external networks to their 
trusted, internal ones.  One common problem with firewalls is that they can only protect the 
network if the devices are programmed correctly, and they can only protect a network from the 
traffic that crosses the device. 
33
 
The original firewall was developed from some of the funding projects for the U.S. Department 
of Defense, but based on the demand from the public sector and the user communities for 
protection, firewall companies have been working to make sure the technology is flexible and 
has the ability to be maintained to ensure that if changes were needed against potential risk to 
make the technology easier to use so more people will use it.34  The origin of the word “firewall” 
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isn’t technical at all, it was used in the construction and automobile industries for a physical 
barrier used to slow down and prevent the spread of a fire until other services could come and 
mitigate the situation.35  In many firms, the firewall is the only layer of protection that is being 
used to defend the network, a fundamental flaw since the firewall was not designed to protect the 
network by itself.   
 
In looking at the time line of the firewalls below, the first type of firewall architecture, 
known as the Packet Filter firewall, was not actually a firewall at all, but rather an 
implementation of Cisco Access-Control lists (ACLs) on their IOS routers.  The premise of each 
of these Packet Filter firewalls was to take one or more addresses (known as the source) and 
allow them to access to a single or group of destinations on a specific set of TCP and UDP 
protocols.  In the case that the entire criterion was allowed on a single rule, the traffic would be 
allowed; however, if the traffic did not meet any of the existing rules, the traffic would implicitly 
be denied.   
Time Line of Firewall Architectures 
36
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In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, these Packet Filter firewalls evolved from the previous ACLs 
into firewall software which gave the administrators a graphical interface to easily configure the 
devices.  While the firewalls and router ACLs were good during their initial deployment, there 
was still concern that a user could spoof an IP address of a device that was on the trusted source 
list and potentially gain access to the internal network.  Another problem was that since the 
Packet firewall filters were applied to the network layer, the firewall device had no visibility in 
to the rest of the IP stack to determine if the traffic was actually the type of traffic expected.  For 
example, the well known port TCP 80 is used by Internet browsers to allow HTTP Web traffic to 
be seen on computers.  However, since TCP port 80 is most likely going to be open in the 
firewall to allow acceptable traffic, this port is a primary target for hackers.  The hackers’ attacks 
may not be actual web traffic, and the firewalls cannot tell the difference and may potentially 
pass an attack through to the internal network.  Of course, a benefit of this firewall architecture 
was that since there was minimal check, network traffic could pass through the firewall much 
faster than it could through other technologies.37 
  
The next type of firewall architecture was known as the Circuit gateway, which was 
introduced as a slightly more sophisticated version of the Packet Filter firewall. The added 
benefit in this type of firewall is that it would analyze the TCP packets to make sure that the TCP 
three-way-handshake was successfully completed prior to letting the traffic pass through the 
firewall.  All TCP conversations start with the initial packet being sent as a SYN packet which 
indicates the start of a message.  The Circuit Gateway firewall would see this type of packet and 
instead of allowing the traffic from the rule like the Packet Filter would, assuming a successful 
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rule match, the Circuit Gateway would send an Acknowledge packet or ACK packet back to the 
source destination.  If the source destination was legitimate, the original source would send back 
a SYN ACK packet which would then indicate the next packet would be the traffic that would be 
starting and the connection would be allowed.  While this type of firewall architecture added an 
additional check with the TCP handshake and was deemed more secure than Packet Filters, it 
also introduced another type of attack against firewalls known a SYN Flood.  In a SYN Flood 
type of attack, an attacker sends an infinite number of SYN requests for the start of a 
transmission to the firewall with no intent on answering these requests.  The firewall, believing 
that these are valid types of requests, would continue to send the ACK packets until the state 
table was filled and a Denial of Service was created.   
  
The next type of firewall was known as the Application Relay.  In this architecture, the 
firewall had the ability to not only look at the three-way-handshake like the Circuit Gateway but 
also had the ability to inspect protocols all the way up to the Application layer verifying that the 
type of traffic expected and the type of traffic received were the same.  In order for this type of 
inspection to occur, each proxy type needed to be created separately in the configuration of the 
firewall such as HTTP and FTP.  Another added security in this type of firewall was that no 
connection from end to end was ever established which kept attackers from actually touching the 
systems.  Instead, the firewall would act as a broker between the external system and the internal 
system, and when the conversation ended between the two systems, the firewall would terminate 
the link between them. 
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The final firewall architecture which is used most commonly today is a hybrid of the 
Packet Filter and Proxy type firewalls better known as Layer 7 firewalls.  These types of 
firewalls have the ability to quickly inspect each packet to the Application layer with little to no 
configuration, thus maintaining the speed of the Packet Filter firewalls. While still faster than the 
original Application relays, there is a great deal of processing power needed in order to deep- 
inspect each packet.  The devices are expensive, and while easier to configure than older 
firewalls, trained administrators are needed in order to make them work more effectively.38  
Some of the advantages of this architecture are that they are also built to understand a great 
number of attacking techniques, such as the Spoofing and SYN Floods, and they are able to 
reject this type of attack rather than succumbing to them.    
  
One dilemma facing the IT security world is how to address all of the new smaller 
businesses, such as EBay stores, which may have little to no firewall or network protection.  
Many smaller businesses lack the financial resources to procure some of the large Layer 7 
devices described earlier, and if they could afford them, these businesses lack the technical 
expertise to set them up correctly.  I had a conversation with my father, Joel Weiss, who owns a 
small business called EGA Online, and we talked about the history of his network security 
installation.  Knowing that I wasn’t available to provide him the IT services that he needed due 
to my full time job, he hired an outside contractor to install the network and set up his server.  I 
had advised him to install a small office version of a Layer 7 firewall that would also allow him 
the ability to establish a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to be able to log into the systems 
remotely to check on inventory or process other requests from his home.  A few months later, my 
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father asked me to come up and investigate why his firewall was not functioning correctly.  
While the technician had spent time configuring the unit, the firewall wasn’t actually filtering 
any traffic and was allowing all traffic from the Internet to get access the systems.  While 
needing a user name and password to connect to the server, hackers had the ability to take over 
any of my father’s systems as there was no perimeter defending his information.  Not only did 
his systems contain purchasers’ addresses and phone numbers, but also had private information, 
such as credit card information, which could have been leaked to the rest of the Internet.  After 
his call, I configured the firewall, and now he is more secure. But as my dad stated, “I only 
called you up here because things didn’t seem right.  I had no idea that my information was 
widely available to the Internet, and I would bet that many other business owners wouldn’t know 
the difference as well.”    While my father had made sure that his desktop systems had antivirus 
and personal firewalls on them, as we saw in the attack section above, many users don’t do this, 
and their machines could become slaves. 
 
Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Protection 
As we stated above, the firewall was designed as a first layer of defense, allowing other defense 
mechanisms time to find and mitigate the intruder.  One commonly deployed system to monitor 
attacks within your internal network system is called an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).  
These systems passively analyze the traffic that traverse through them and compare the traffic 
against a loaded set of signatures of different types of possible attack patterns.  These patterns 
can be used to identify such things as worms, viruses, and other network based attacks.  When 
the IDS believes that it has found an attack, it alerts a console or set of users that something has 
possibly been breached, and that someone should further inspect the situation.  While there are 
many false alarms in the world of IDS systems, it is much better to know that an act may be 
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occurring than not knowing at all.  In order to better work with the systems, it is recommended 
that the administrators “tune” these devices to allow certain types of actions which are deemed 
acceptable, to minimize false alerts.  In the event of an actual attack, with further analysis, the 
forensic information gathered by these systems can be used to help in an investigation where the 
potential findings might show a much larger issue that the original anomaly that was identified 
by the alert.  
  
As more and more exploits come out, some companies are requiring more security than 
just the passive Intrusion Detection systems, and they have moved towards newer Intrusion 
Protection systems (IPS).  These systems are very similar to the IDS systems in that they 
constantly are analyzing the traffic, but they also have the ability to remove sources from their 
current Virtual Network (VLAN) and put them in a remediation VLAN, or “penalty box,” so that 
they can be quarantined and inspected without affecting the rest of the network.39  This type of 
system would be better suited to handle the zero day exploits that I mentioned earlier.  In the 
event that such an exploit were to be released to the Internet, the signature could be added to the 
IPS systems to guard against the zero day exploit as well.  By being able to quarantine source 
computers from the rest of the network, the infection from one machine to others can be 
controlled and have a much lower compromise rate.40  
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802.1x and Network Access Control 
With the multitude of network-accessible devices into today’s workplace, it is essential 
that we make sure that the users connecting to our networks are indeed the authorized people and 
devices associated with the firm.  Unauthorized users could easily steal data or infect the network 
with a virus, so it is vital to know who is on the company’s network. 
41
 
802.1x is a IEEE standard that is used on networks to verify that the devices connecting to the 
network are who they say they are,  to restrict validated users to a certain portion of the network, 
and to do so real-time with logging capabilities.  Identity can be defined in a variety of ways, 
such as a username and password, the MAC address of the machine, an IP address, or a digital 
certificate.  When the credentials are sent to the determining server, only Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) is available to be passed by the network switches.  By only 
allowing the EAP, this prevents other external machines from plugging directly into the network 
and receiving an IP address until the user is authenticated.  The user’s information is then sent to 
an access server to be challenged, and if the user is authenticated successfully, the switch port is 
instructed to give the user the appropriate access to the network.  In the picture below, we see a 
graphical representation of the supplicant (user PC), sending the request to an authentication 
server to request access. 
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42
 
 Network Access Control (NAC) is another tool that can be used in conjunction with the 
802.1x to ensure that, when authorized users connect to the network, they do so in a safe and 
secure manner and do not affect the rest of the infrastructure.  As I said earlier, more and more IP 
capable devices are moving around the workplace, and these devices are capable of logging into 
multiple networks.  When users take their business laptops either to their home or to a hotspot, 
they put themselves and the corporation at greater risk since they are no longer protected by the 
corporation’s defenses.  When on a personal network rather than the corporate one, the defenses 
are limited to what is in place by that entity, and in the case of hotspots, in many cases, there is 
no security at all between the user PC and the rest of the Internet.  In this case, the user is only 
protected by the patches loaded, firewall software, and antivirus software loaded on the PC.  
Since the user is connected to a network outside the control of the corporation, they have no way 
to monitor where the user is browsing on the Internet and company’s defenses cannot offer 
protection.  There is a concern that a user could go to an infected website and bring a potential 
exploit back into the company network when they go back to their offices.  As I stated before, 
when the user and password information is sent to the authentication server in an 802.1x 
implemented network, the user is then granted access to the rest of the network.  When NAC is 
implemented in conjunction with 802.1x, the user, upon successful authentication, would then 
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have their PC’s information checked by a monitor server in a quarantined virtual network to 
make sure that all patch levels are up to date, antivirus and firewall definitions are current, and 
that PC poses no potential threat to the rest of the environment.  In the event that the PC fails one 
of the checks deemed by the NAC servers, the PC would continue to stay in the quarantined 
VLAN, and the appropriate patches would be applied to that device.  Only if a PC is deemed 
secure, through a successful check or after the remediation of an infected device, would the PC 
be allowed to join the rest of the company infrastructure.43 
 
Building the Network from Scratch to Defend for Today 
 The entire business world needs to think differently when looking to defend the 
perimeter of their network due to the increase of such technologies such as wireless, smart 
phones, laptops, and with the significant increase in the number of remote users connecting from 
anywhere. Even as few as ten years ago, the only way into the company network was via the 
assets inside the network perimeter, behind the castle gates so to speak.  In looking at a 2007  
survey done by Sophos, a leader IT Security and data protection, we can see a distribution of 
users across our company’s networks that look significantly different than the user population 
even five years ago.44 
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45
 
With this diverse user population of employees and users, and with the increased focus 
on making company resources Internet available, there is a fine line between what behaviors are 
acceptable and which ones could cause risk.  Such actions as downloading software which could 
have vulnerabilities and less than kosher Internet browsing with company assets might be an 
issue for the corporation.  Remember, the premise of Network Security is to ensure that only 
authorized users are allowed to get into the network infrastructure using approved protocols, 
applications, and devices, while unauthorized users are prevented from doing so.  As we 
discussed earlier in this paper, the cost of data breaches, whether from external or internal 
sources, is significant and can result in the loss of revenue, business productivity, and consumer 
confidence.  It is therefore in a company’s best financial and commercial interest to invest in the 
strongest network security design and tools possible. 
   
In this next section, I have designed a network that I think will have a better chance of 
succeeding against today’s ever changing Internet environment.  In the following diagrams, I 
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will try to explain what I have implemented and how these devices will be advantageous from a 
security point of view to a firm.  One caveat that I will make is that many network designers 
have their own opinion on how a network should be defended, so I am not saying that this is the 
only way to go about how to construct the network.  In addition, I have chosen this architecture 
without considering the cost or the expertise required to put this type of an environment together.  
In the case of smaller offices, some of the options I outline may not be feasible, and at the end of 
the section, I will try to explain what options smaller business owners have available to them and 
how they might modify my design to work in their environment.    
 
Prior to going into the design, one must establish the following criteria/parameters before 
trying to design a network.  First, identify what data your company considers to be “mission 
critical” and where that data will reside.  Second, think about how you might create a central 
control model that would protect the entire network without leaving any parts unprotected.  
Third, establish a good process for monitoring and auditing your security model so that you can 
continuously improve and be prepared to respond to new and changing threats.    While this 
design may give a blueprint on where to start for a firm, adequate processes must be in place to 
make sure that your design isn’t set up to fail. Remember that every day, new exploits and 
vulnerabilities are discovered creating the constant need for flexibility in your security posture.  
The potential risk of every threat cannot necessarily be evaluated, so there will be accepted risks 
in each design.    It is each company’s responsibility to identify the risks and potential weakness 
in their security design and to have suitable mitigation plans in place. 
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External Network Design  
Perimeter Firewall (Proxy) Cluster
Firewall Cluster to Internal 
Network
Other Extranet
Firewall
Extranet
Gateway to 
Internet
External Proxy Servers
External Email Gateway
Web Servers
IPS
Shared Services
For 
Collaboration
IPS
IPS
Internal Email Server
IPS
Internal Proxy Servers
Spam Filter
VPN Concentrator
Authentication Server
WAF
Honeypot
Honeypot Server Farm
Corporate 
Extranet 
Services
DMZ
Collaboration 
Networks
Intranet
 
In the first drawing, you will notice that I have designed an environment with multiple 
firewalls defending the perimeter.  Some designers might weigh the benefits of having redundant 
firewalls in an environment an insurance policy versus the costs associated with purchasing and 
maintaining two firewalls.  I think that with today’s threats it is imperative to run a cluster of 
firewalls running in unison. By implementing the cluster, we protect the performance of the 
enterprise in the event of a failure in one of the units. Other designers also may question whether 
or not the second set of firewalls if both the perimeter and interior firewalls are of the same type 
  
35 
 
such as Proxy or Layer Seven actually do any type of filtering if they are the same type of 
firewall since traffic may be able to fool both firewall types. 
 
Perimeter Firewall (Proxy) Cluster (Manufacturer 1)
Firewall Cluster to Internal 
Network – Manufacturer 2
Other Extranet
Firewall – Manufacturer 2
Extranet- Manufacturer 2
IPS
  To mitigate any concern about a single 
point of failure, I have put in a cluster of firewalls in each instance, with each individual firewall 
being large enough to handle the entire load of the enterprise traffic.  In the case that one of the 
individual firewalls would need servicing, such as maintenance or patching, the other firewall in 
the cluster would remain online handling the traffic.  I have chosen to use different types of 
models and manufacturers of the firewalls for the external and internal perimeters to ensure that 
a single vulnerability affecting one type of firewall could not potentially be exploited against 
both security layers and thus allowing a hacker access through to the internal network.  Since 
duplicate Layer Seven firewalls might only slow down the traffic and have only a limited 
improvement in the security, I have implemented a Proxy Application firewall cluster rather than 
the newer Layer Seven technologies for the external perimeter.  Part of this thinking is that the 
Proxy firewalls do not actually allow the external user to enter the network, as we discussed 
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before, but rather the firewall works on behalf of the user to connect them to their resources.  By 
taking this approach, there would be no direct contact from the user to the resources, and there 
would be much less chance of unauthorized access.  It is vital that the rule set on the external 
perimeter firewall is set to only permit traffic to access one of the two extranets, featured on the 
left and the right of the IPS unit in the diagram above, and that no firewall rule allows direct 
access from the Internet into the internal network.  The firewalls that lead from the extranets and 
into the internal network are Layer Seven firewalls, as they do a much deeper inspection of the 
packets to ensure that the traffic that is permitted further into the network is valid.    For instance, 
HTTPS via port TCP 443 could be used in the correct format or could be a crafted packet sent by 
a hacker that would look like HTTPS.  This inspection of the valid HTTPS packets, which 
normally would have been allowed by the firewall rule, would reject these crafted packets using 
a pattern matching system. By virtue of using the High Availability firewall clusters and 
different types and models of firewalls, we are able to achieve a higher level of security without 
sacrificing performance by maintaining the uptime of the overall environment utilizing the load 
balancing. 
  
In my proposed design, all external traffic, including services such as HTTP or HTTPS 
traffic to web servers, Email, and Domain Name Services (DNS) for resolution of Internet 
names, would be routed immediately to the Corporate Extranet services network for filtering 
prior to entering the internal network.  It is extremely important to have a layer of filters in place 
to ensure that the traffic is forced to go through a set of checks and balances prior to being 
allowed into the company network.   
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Another challenge in today’s business world is creating environments where users from 
two different companies working together on a project can access the data they both need easily 
and securely.  In my proposed design, Collaboration networks would be used for a joint effort 
between your firm and an outside one.  By allowing that traffic to go to an extranet rather than 
your internal network,   you can publish only the data required for both companies’ teams to 
work on the joint project without giving the other company, and potentially unwelcome viewers, 
open access to your entire data network.   Some collaboration extranets require services that 
originate in the internal networks.  If so, it is extremely important to make sure that this type of 
traffic is initiated from the internal network and that the traffic permitted from the external 
shared services into the internal services is kept to a minimum, if allowed at all.  The Layer 
Seven firewalls featured in the design are configured to work in a stateful manner, meaning that 
they will allow the return traffic to flow to a device only when authorized.  By allowing the 
internal services to go to the extranet, you can leverage some of your internal infrastructure and 
reduce your overall cost by not having to recreate or protect the entire extranet environment. 
 
In each of the environments, the DMZ, Corporate Extranet Services, Collaboration 
Network, and the Intranet, I have placed an IPS unit directly behind each of the firewalls to 
ensure that all network traffic passing through is validated.  In the event the traffic is not 
allowed, these devices will ensure that that the unauthorized traffic is prevented from traversing 
the rest of the network.   I recommend an IPS system instead of a passive IDS since questionable 
traffic is stopped automatically rather than requiring human analysis intervention.  If some of the 
traffic stopped is later determined to be acceptable, the devices can be tuned to allow that type of 
traffic to traverse freely in the future.  When using IDS units, by the time a human is able to 
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check the system alerts and intervene, it may already be too late, and  if the traffic is indeed an 
attack, data may have already been stolen or destroyed and cost your business a significant 
amount of money.  By keeping the definitions on these units constantly up to date, there is a very 
good probability of defending against even zero day exploits and better protecting the 
environment.  As with IDS systems, IPS devices are extremely useful in the case of forensics as 
the devices log the type of attacks that have occurred on a machine so that investigators can try 
to piece back what commands the attackers actually used and using this information as clues to 
finding the source of the intrusion.  
 
In order to manage the devices in the event of an attack and to aggregate the logs from 
the external devices, it is very important to have management addresses of each of the device 
work on what is known as an out of band network.  By creating this out of band network, we can 
ensure connectivity to the devices in the event that normal Ethernet in band connections are 
severed and the devices are physically isolated from that path.  Also, it is imperative that all of 
the communications used to manage the firewalls and IPS units is encrypted and that each 
administrator utilizes a two factor authentication token to ensure that only authorized individuals 
gain access.  Finally, by having all of the logs from the external firewalls and IPS aggregated on 
this channel, there is a greater probability of identifying trends in the correlate logs to prevent 
future attacks.   
 
The Honeypot network is specifically designed so that hackers can and will break in 
order to learn to specific methods and techniques that are currently being employed on the 
Internet.  Consider this environment as a “playground for hackers” where the intruder would that 
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that they were on your production network and you are asking them to exploit your environment 
in order to better protect yourself.  .  By monitoring what hackers do to the systems, the data can 
be used to train a company’s security task force in order to better protect the systems.  In some 
cases, there are good reasons to have ethical hackers on your staff test your network security to  
make sure your security posture is up to date with current threats and to keep your staff well-
trained on emergency response procedures.  Not only are you able to see what exploits that 
potential hackers may use against you, but also you can see the types of reconnaissance tactics 
they are using to map out   your network design and discover weaknesses.  Administrators 
should realize that hackers have tools to tell the difference between Honeypot networks and the 
actual network, but there are many hackers that will fall for the trap anyway. 
 
 Email poses another significant challenge to network security as the use of it has 
changed radically since its inception with DARPANET.  Email used to be a program which used 
to compliment what could not be done via snail mail, a conference call, or the traditional 
business trip.  In today’s business model however, Email is the lifeblood of many organizations 
with millions of Emails exchanging hands every day.  It is thought that over 19% of the average 
individuals working day is spent using Email; however, I believe that many users are above this 
number as I personally receive over 300 Emails each business day46.  In addition, with the 
introduction of mobile clients, such as Blackberries, the parameters of what used to be the 
traditional workday are shattered as people are sending Emails at all times of the day.   
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Many users who mean well in wanting to work from home to continue their work 
actually are causing a greater problem in the security of the internal network.  In a Sophos poll, 
77% of users have sent sensitive data to their personal accounts in order to continue their work 
rather than using the methods such as VPN to keep this information on the internal network.   
Also Sophos found out that 70% of the respondents are concerned of the loss of company 
sensitive data by improper use of email.47  
48
 
As we stated earlier, 90% of Internet Email is spam, and so the best posture is to protect our 
users from potential issues such as Viruses, Phishing requests, and Trojan Horse before they 
receive malicious messages in their inbox and accidentally pass them on.  In looking at this 
picture, we realize all of the challenges that a company must think about when trying to protect 
their infrastructure from these malicious Email media attacks. .  
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49
 
 When thinking of the overall Email security posture, we have to think of a three step 
approach of:  Preventing malicious code which might get onto the network from accessing the 
Email gateway, protecting the Email server from potential threats, and protecting the end users 
personal computers. I first propose using a spam filter prior to allowing the inbound Email from 
ever getting to the internal environment.   This first layer of prevention will block most of the 
spam, phishing, and other malicious Emails from ever getting into the environment.  This spam 
filter needs to be constantly checked and updated as newer definitions are introduced.  Spam will 
still be able to traverse the network, but the Spam filter will reduce the amount of it.   
 
Next, we must install an External Email gateway to make sure that the mail received is 
actually destined for the internal network users, and if not, to discard that mail.  In addition, this 
gateway will scan all attachments and will strip off any that contain viruses.  I suggest that the 
gateway be configured to allow only certain types of Email attachments, such as Word 
documents, Excel Spreadsheets, Adobe PDF files, Picture files such as JPEG, Visio documents, 
and PowerPoint files, and that all other extensions will be automatically removed.  This strategy 
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will reduce the number of files that need to be virus scanned by the External Email gateway, and 
will prevent all other types of files from ever entering the enterprise.   
 
Compressed files, such as ZIP or TAR files can be very convenient for a user, but 
emailing these files can allow certain programs to pass through the first-line email filters 
undetected.  I believe that these types of files should be blocked altogether. However, if there is a 
good reason to permit them on the network, the gateway scanner must be capable of inspecting 
each file in the Zip package and removing the entire file in the event that a virus is found.  As we 
will discuss later, it is also extremely important to make sure that the Internet Email server is up 
to date on all applicable OS and Program patches so that the server itself is protected from any 
viruses that might make it through the outer defense layers.  The goal is to be able to use the 
above methods which then would prevent the personal computers of the user community from 
becoming infected and putting a hacker closer to the sensitive company data that they desire.  
The most important Email security measure that a firm can employ is to educate their user 
community.  If there is a continuous awareness of threats amongst the user population, there is a 
much greater chance that the users will be able to identify potential malicious messages when 
they arrive in their inbox and will be able to remove them without incident.  As we stated before, 
many hackers do a great deal of investigative work prior to sending Emails to high company 
officials and make the messages appear to be sent from people that the official would know.  The 
education needs to reach all levels of staff to ensure that it is truly effective. 
 
 In my proposed design, the external web servers are secured by not only the two firewalls 
mentioned previously but also by putting them behind what is known as a Web Application 
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Firewall (WAF). While the firewalls and the IPS units we deployed are also going to be 
inspecting the HTTP and HTTPS traffic that is destined for these Web servers, these WAF 
devices also look at the proper web context of the HTML traffic to ensure that the conversation 
is authentic.  WAF devices are session-aware, meaning that they use web-path logic to prevent 
conversations from being hijacked.  In addition, these devices also provide normalization and 
scanning of the HTML to ensure that the web pages are functioning properly.50  In 2008 alone, 
the number of websites infected each day has dramatically increased from approximately 1000 to 
over 5000 sites,an increase of over 400%.  For example, the MiamiDolphins.com and the UN 
home page web sites compromised and by only browsing the content on those sites, other users 
could become infected.51  This Web Application Firewall can help prevent your company’s 
server from being another casualty of the Internet War.   
 
Another means of protecting you Internet Web servers and, by extension, protecting your 
customers and your company’s reputation is the use of Extended Value SSL Certificates 
(EVSSL).  As in the case with many phishing sites, it has become more and more difficult to be 
able to distinguish between genuine web sites and malicious facsimiles of those sites.  Since SSL 
certificates are extremely easy to obtain, hackers further camouflage their attacks by using the 
same encryption technology as legitimate web sites.  As opposed to SSL certificates, a 
considerable amount of information is required before the Certificate Authority (CA) will issue 
                                                 
50
 Importance of Web Application Firewall Technology for Protecting Web-based Resources, retrieved 5/12/09, 
retrieved from 
http://whitepapers.zdnet.com/abstract.aspx?kw=Importance+of+Web+Application+Firewall+Technology+for+Prote
cting+Web-based+Resources&docid=351903 
 
51
 Protecting Your Network Against the Growing Danger of Web Attacks, retrieved 5/12/09, retrieved from 
http://whitepapers.zdnet.com/abstract.aspx?kw=Protecting+Your+Network+Against+the+Growing+Danger+of+We
b+Attacks&docid=974677 
 
  
44 
 
an EVSSL certificate to a business.  Now, when your customer traverses your web site in a 
secure manner the Internet address bar in their window will turn green, visually indicating that 
the user has accessed the correct website.  For instance, a normal user might enter the website of 
a bank or merchant in the course of their every day interactions and there would appear to be no 
difference in this type of HTTP traffic.  When the user signs in their credentials for their specific 
account or in the case of entering sensitive data such as in the case of a purchase, the 
conversation would then change to HTTPS/SSL and the user could easily identify that they were 
at the valid site.  VeriSign, one of the leading Certificate Authorities in the world, did a poll of 
users which said that 97% of the respondents would be more likely to put their credit card 
information on an EVSSL site compared to only 63% of non EVSSL sites.52  EVSSL not only 
provides another valuable layer of physical protection, but also increases consumer confidence, 
potentially leading to increased sales.  
53
  
 
 The External Web Proxies that I have included in my design provide an added layer of 
security for both internal network personnel as well as your extranet traffic by preventing access 
to certain websites and by only having the one device actually correspond to the Internet.  Proxy 
servers can block access to websites in one of two ways, either by blocking a list of specific 
                                                 
52
 Security and Trust:The Backbone of Doing Business over the Internet, retrieved 5/12/2009, retrieved from 
http://whitepapers.zdnet.com/abstract.aspx?kw=Security+and+Trust%3A+The+Backbone+of+Doing+Business+ove
r+the+Internet&docid=390211 
 
53
 Security and Trust:The Backbone of Doing Business over the Internet, retrieved 5/12/2009, retrieved from 
http://whitepapers.zdnet.com/abstract.aspx?kw=Security+and+Trust%3A+The+Backbone+of+Doing+Business+ove
r+the+Internet&docid=390211 
  
45 
 
websites, known as a black list, or by blocking all unknown categorized websites, known as a 
white list.  I would first implement a black list to prevent all traffic to all sites which are deemed 
improper for the workplace, such pornography, gambling, or other illicit sites, as many of these 
websites are also infected with malicious content such as viruses and Trojans which could 
ultimately infect end user machines.  I also recommend creating a black list for all types of 
external web mail services such as Gmail, Yahoo, AOL, etc. to prevent users from accessing 
these sites from the internal network.  External email sites may not have the same security 
measures in place for scanning and filtering email traffic as you have implemented, so by 
allowing your user community to connect to these sites and download potentially infected files, 
you would be bypassing the security set up in the Email section of this paper and could be 
jeopardizing the health of entire environment.  While it is possible for users to access external 
web mail service sites off the company network and download files, we should prevent them 
from doing so while they are on the company network.  Users should also be made aware of the 
potential dangers downloading files while off the company network to help enforce your policy 
while on the company network.   
 
After these groups have been black listed, I would then implement a white list which 
would block unidentified sites from your Proxy.  In the configuration of Proxy servers, types of 
websites are broken down into categories, such as sports, news, search engines, etc, but there is 
also a group called “uncategorized” in which new sites that have not yet been placed in a specific 
category reside.  I recommend that this entire category be blocked.  When viruses, worms, and 
other exploits try to communicate back to their home destination, they most likely communicate 
with sites that are not well known, and thus are not categorized in the Proxy servers.  By 
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preventing return communication, the hacker would not be able to know that a machine had been 
compromised and would not be able to control the machine, thus thwarting a potential attack.54   
In addition to blocking specific web sites for your user population, you should also log what sites 
they are accessing to spot trends and identify additional sites that might need to be blocked in the 
future.  There are many different types of attacks and issues that users could infect their 
computers by simply traversing malicious sites.  By using the White and Black lists that I have 
suggested, we will be able to continue to ensure that the number of infections from the internal 
systems will be lower and would increase the ROI as your labor would be able to address other 
potential issues. 
 
The VPN Concentrator allows secure communications with users who are working from 
designated remote locations, such as their homes, to be able to utilize the full resources of the 
company’s internal network.  As we saw in the first Sophos survey in my design, Mobile 
employees and Remote user employees constitute over 30% of the workforce, and these users 
need a secure alternative to being directly connected behind the company’s perimeter network.  
In order to better ensure the security of your company network, one feature that must be disabled 
on the VPN Client loaded on the workstation is the Split tunneling option.  If Split tunneling is 
activated, this allows a user laptop to be connected to the company network at the same time as 
being connected to another network, such as a home or hotel, creating a complete security 
breach.  By disabling Split tunneling, we are able to ensure that while connected remotely to the 
company network, the user appears as though they are in their office at their desk and all 
company network security policies are enforced.  I recommend that the encryption rate of the 
                                                 
54
 The Dirt on Whitelisting, retrieved 4/23/09, retrieved from 
http://www.darkreading.com/security/management/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=211201169 
 
  
47 
 
VPN concentrator should be set to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) at 256 bits to 
provide increased security.     I also would require VPN users to use a two-factor key token 
authentication prior to allowing them on the network.  Two-factor authentication is a much more 
effective means of correctly  identifying members of our user community, making attacks from 
unknown external sources significantly more challenging.55 
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In this diagram, I have depicted my recommendation for how to maintain the best 
security from the inside of the perimeter network.   Note first the firewall and IPS that I have 
installed between the server network and the rest of the user community.  It is imperative that we 
take into consideration threats which might originate inside our network, such as Social 
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Engineering.  To mitigate this risk, I have limited the ports and services that the user community 
could use to access the server environment.  In addition, by placing the IPS unit inside the server 
farm area, we can ensure that the packets and traffic destined for that area are legitimate.  As I 
mentioned when discussing 802.1x, it is extremely important to make sure that the company 
knows for certain that their employees are the only ones connected to the internal network, and 
that each firm have a real-time accountability of the devices on that network.  802.1x identifies 
which users truly belong on the network by going through an authentication process.  Looking at 
the diagram below, the user requests access to the network, is challenged by the authentication 
server to verify their identity, and if confirmed, is allowed to connect to the internal network. 
56
 
Using this method to verify identities, we can guarantee that no unauthorized external devices 
would be able to receive an IP address or to traverse the internal network.  This solution does 
have certain limitations in that not all devices are able to load supplicant software, such as 
printers. To accommodate these devices, we need to install MAC Authentication Bypass mode.  
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As discussed previously, in order to get an IP address a device needs to send the EAP request to 
the authentication server from the software client loaded on the device.   However, printers and 
other peripherals are not able to send the EAP request themselves.  In these cases, 802.1x can be 
implemented to approve the device after three EAP attempts from the MAC address.  Note, this 
installation needs to be done extremely carefully and not implemented across the board as MAC 
addresses of the peripheral devices could be spoofed It is important to review the logs of the 
authentication server to ensure that there are not a significant number of entries showing attempts 
or failures for the MAC address bypassed devices.   
 
Once the user is validated by the authentication server, the switch port is open for regular 
communications, allowing the user to log into the domain using their Windows user name and 
password.  I suggest using the Kerberos V5 Authentication method.  When the user tries to 
authenticate with the rest of the Windows Active Directory, Kerberos V5 provides an encrypted 
validation of the user’s identity, known as a ticket, and once the identity is confirmed by the 
Local Security Authority on the Domain Controllers, the user is able to access the appropriate 
areas based on their security profile.57   
 
For the purposes of this paper, I will not address the development of the entire Windows 
and Active Directory methodology.  There are, however, certain implementations of security 
practices that I suggest to deploy.  First, make sure that the Administrator account on all servers 
is renamed and the passwords for that account are stored in a locked safe.  Secondly, make sure 
that all Guest accounts are disabled.  Since both the Administrator and Guest accounts are well 
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known throughout the computer industry, they are frequently targets of malicious attacks, and 
following these two steps can avoid many attacks.  Another step would be to make sure that you 
limit the number of users that have local Administrator rights to their end devices.  Again, many 
attacks require Administrator rights on the end user PC, and allowing the user full command of 
their PC increases the odds are that they could activate attacks that would normally have been 
dormant.  Next, make sure that the Domain administrators each have two accounts:  One with 
regular user permissions for their regular tasks and the other with administrator privileges for 
logging on to the servers.  For instance, if Bob Smith was the administrator, Bob might use the 
account “Bsmith” to log into his end user device to run his normal operations.  However, if Bob 
needed to log into the server, he would use the account of “Bsmith_admin” to log in.  If the 
administrator typically logs in with the regular account, there is less opportunity for the 
administrator’s usual workstation to be compromised since they would be logged in using a 
lower level of authority.  Next, Domain policy should require all users to change their passwords 
every 45 days or less, and require the use of “Strong” Passwords.  Strong passwords should 
contain a combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters, and 
should be at least 8 characters long.  Finally, I believe it is important that all Share drives be 
established using the hidden share feature in Windows by implementing the $ feature.  If the 
environment is compromised, intruders would not be able to see the entire volume of the 
different share drives defined on a machine, providing another protective barrier for the data. 
 
Another important initiative is establishing a managed desktop environment that is 
integrated with the NAC implementation.  I envision that the desktop image for all personal 
computers in a firm would be developed from a single image with a base number of applications 
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installed, such as Internet Explorer, personal firewall, antivirus, antispyware, and a hard drive 
encryption program.  If any additional applications are necessary, they would be installed locally 
onto the user PC on a case by case basis.  I would also recommend delivering applications via 
thin client where possible for licensing, overhead, and remote usage performance reasons with 
the exception of the Microsoft Office suite.  The Microsoft Office suite would be installed as a 
virtual streaming application from the server.  When a user wants to use a Microsoft Application, 
it would be streamed to the desktop and the program would reside in a cache file on the machine. 
In this model, the program does not actually exist on the machine and thus only the copy on the 
streaming server needs to be patched and updated, significantly reducing administrative 
overhead.  Using this central authority model, we are able to keep a full inventory of all of the 
software that is loaded onto each device and are aware of the common vulnerabilities associated 
with them.  In this managed desktop environment, as vulnerabilities are announced, a team could 
then centrally distribute updates to all of the workstations, such as Microsoft patches, application 
patches, antivirus definitions, personal firewall updates, and spyware updates, ensuring that all 
end user devices are up to date and fully protected.   
 
The managed desktop design adds a step to the 802.1x authentication model that we 
previously discussed.  By incorporating the NAC, after the 802.1x server authenticates the user’s 
login, the end user device then checks with the NAC server to see if it meets the minimum 
managed desktop requirements of patch level, virus definition, etc. If the NAC server confirms 
that the device meets all requirements, the user PC is issued an IP address and is allowed to 
proceed onto the internal network.  If the PC does not meet the minimum NAC requirements, the 
device is connected to a remediation VLAN to be patched and brought up to date.  After 
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receiving all necessary patches and security definitions, the device would go through the entire 
802.1x authentication sequence again, this time meeting the NAC server requirements, and being 
allowed onto the network.  While the NAC  process would be automated and not require user 
intervention, it is important that the user community understand the additional steps of the design  
as this will add some time to the logon process, but ultimately will make the end user network a 
safer place.  Attached below is a graphical representation of the NAC logon process.
58
 
To interconnect the main office to remote satellite offices, I recommend implementing an 
MPLS VPN in one of the carrier networks because it augments the traditional IP based network 
and can offer security similar to traditional Frame Relay and ATM networks at a lower cost.  In 
addition, the MPLS VPN routers are secure from any denial of service attacks which might occur 
in the carrier’s total cloud, separate from our company’s network.  The inherent protection of 
MPLS is that one VPN cannot enter another VPN in the carrier network.  The only place in our 
design where a denial of service attack could occur would be at our perimeter; the single point 
where my enterprise designs touches the rest of the pure Internet.  Since the carrier does not 
provide the IP address space of their cloud, it would be extremely difficult for an attacker to try 
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to map the whole VPN.  In a MPLS VPN, the border routers which merge the firm’s internal 
network to the MPLS cloud is the only point where the carrier’s IP is visible.  To mitigate any 
risk, our Customer Edge Router (CE) and the carrier’s Provider Edge Router (PE) are set up with 
specific access lists that ensure that those two routers can talk only to each other and not to any 
other connection.  This PE and CE connection maps your internal routing protocol to the 
carrier’s BGP cloud, so it would be extremely dangerous if another router could talk and 
advertise routes.  
59To ensure that all of the routers are secure from malicious configuration change, administrators 
should be required to use a two factor authentication token to use enhanced privileges.  Also, all 
of the routers in the enterprise should report back to a management station to provide their access 
and security logs, accounting for any changes to the configuration of the device and to 
automatically backup their configuration to ensure that the device could be recovered quickly in 
the event of a failure.   
 
Similar to the external perimeter design, I believe that there should be an out of band 
network connection to each of the routers and switches in the enterprise to ensure that if a denial 
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of service attack were present on the devices on the internal network, they could still be 
administered from the outside network and the issue could be remediated. 
 
How would this environment work against today’s viruses? 
 The real test of any security system is how it would fare against some of the most current 
threats that have been on the Internet.  In March of 2009, Adobe announced that a critical, zero-
day exploit vulnerability had surfaced with their popular PDF format, and that an attacker could 
craft an infected PDF file to instantly take control of a user’s machine if they simply opened the 
file.60  If the attacker had attempted to email the file into a company that had implemented our 
recommended network design, the IPS sensor would have detected that the file was non-
compliant with the standard PDF file format, and the file would have been quarantined.  
However, some firms don’t block Webmail servers in their Proxy server black lists, and the file 
could have been downloaded into the enterprise.  Our recommended design specifically set the 
black list rule to prevent this; however, many new Webmail sites are set up daily, and all sites 
may not be blocked at a given time.  Should the infected file find its way into the environment 
via one of these external Webmail servers, if the file were executed, the infected machine would 
first try to “phone home” and inform the attacker that the machine was compromised.  In this 
case, the white list rule in our design would have blocked the outgoing web traffic since the virus 
traffic was destined for one of the uncategorized web sites which are specifically denied. 
  
As we mentioned earlier in the paper, thousands of websites are exploited every day.  By 
using the Web Application Firewall in conjunction with the IPS and the two perimeter firewalls, 
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we can feel fairly confident that our machines would be able to avoid many of the exploitation 
problems plaguing the rest of the Internet.  Using the managed desktop infrastructure and NAC 
systems, we should be able to defend our end user machines and mitigate many of the infections 
since only patched and up to date machines would be allowed access to our network.  In 
February of 2009, a major defense contractor failed to implement some of the simple Web server 
protections that we have installed in my proposed infrastructure which allowed some of the 
government websites they administer to be hacked.  Following this incident, the federal 
government took away the company’s privileges to administer any websites on their behalf until 
they could show demonstrate that they had corrected their processes and would take greater 
responsibility for their web hosting service.  This failure to implement simple safeguards in their 
web environment could affect the company’s future viability in receiving future government 
awards and could have been avoided if they had followed a structured security plan.61 
  
Finally, by addressing our systems with 802.1x, we can protect our environment and 
ensure that the only actual, authorized users of our internal network are connecting to our 
infrastructure.  By having a better accountability of the systems connected to the network, we 
can have better confidence that viruses will not be loaded by rogue systems and that rogue 
systems will not be able to steal the company data. 
Policies and Procedures to Keep Us Secure 
 In order to make sure that the network stays secure after we implement all of the practices 
listed above, we have to make sure that we have some policies and procedures in place to ensure 
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that the network defenses continue to run.  The first procedure that is necessary is making sure 
that the company has an active patching policy in place.  The patching policy would require that 
network administrators regularly find out what exploits are coming out and alert the 
administrators that a problem exists.  The policy should also make sure that the patches are 
loaded in a timely manner.  The next procedure that needs to be in place is the education of the 
user community.  Many normal users are unaware of the Internet threats and their transactions 
while off the company network could be disastrous when the return to the internal systems.  By 
educating the user community about various types of attacks and the things to look for, users 
may be able to spot issues and awareness alone may be enough to stop some potential security 
issues.  Every day, there are billions of lines of code written all across the world without security 
awareness, and by thinking security first, exploits could be prevented.  The lack of an active and 
tested backup and restore procedure could be another potential risk.  In many cases, servers are 
being backed up on the network, but we never validate that the information that has been stored 
is valid or whether it could be restored successfully in case of emergency.  It is important that we 
make sure this process is tested in case a mission critical file is infected or deleted, and we need 
to be able to roll back the clock and recover the file.  Building on the backup and recovery issue, 
companies should maintain and test an active disaster recovery plan.  If a natural disaster were to 
impact your firm, much of the information and computing equipment could be destroyed, and it 
would take a significant amount of time and money to be able to restore service.  By having a 
business continuity disaster recovery plan, a firm can better address which infrastructure 
elements should be restored first and how to go about this.  It is extremely important to be able to 
provide conclusive test results, because if you can’t test it, the plan is flawed.  Another important 
process is to have a security assessment plan for your business.  With the security assessment 
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plan, there needs to an active plan to scan across the network looking for potential 
vulnerabilities. In many cases, companies are not aware of all of the connected devices that could 
potentially be a threat to the overall safety of the network.  In addition, there needs to be an 
independent team that audits the standard operating procedures and how the security practices 
are applied.  It is extremely important that there are written procedures, and that all of the 
engineers that are aware of them.  As I mentioned previously concerning VPNs, it is very 
important to consider some type of two-factor or biometric system to be able to properly identify 
the authorized users.  Finally, it is imperative to make sure that the people who are administering 
the systems that are defending the network understand the entire environment and constantly 
given technical training.  We are coming to realize that the world is constantly changing and the 
Internet is an extremely dangerous place. Without the proper training, administrators could be 
allowing breaches into our network that could have been prevented.62 63 64 
Conclusion 
 
 During this paper, we have seen that the Internet is a much more dangerous place than it 
was when ARPANET was established as the first open network.  We have seen that not only are 
attacks happening, but also they are happening faster and as part of a new age of cyber-warfare.  
We have seen that while there are tools such as firewalls and virus protection available, that 
people aren’t using them, and hackers are taking advantage of these shortcomings. For example, 
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even the Federal agencies aren’t following their own guidelines, published in January of 2008, to 
preventing phishing attacks from allowing their employees to divulge personal information or 
inadvertently loading a virus onto their systems.  By virtue of this report being announced, NIST 
drafted a new standard to help identify "the authenticity of domain name information and 
maintain the integrity of domain name information in transit."65  In 2008, hackers successfully 
breached the Verizon Communications network over 90 times and stole 285 million records.  
This extremely disturbing statistic was discovered during a postmortem investigation of these 
breaches, and it was determined that over 90% of the breaches could have been avoided if 
Verizon had implemented simple security measures.66  In today’s economy, one may question 
whether or not companies are going to invest in new, expensive tools in order to improve their 
security posture.  It is vital that each firm have a security audit conducted by an outside firm to 
determine the potential issues in the firm’s network.  With the results of the audit, a firm may be 
able to determine their security posture and whether a reduction in funds would jeopardize the 
company mission.  In 2008, the United States Air Force established a cyber command center to 
be able to further mitigate the attacks of today, and the Army and Navy already have established 
their centers as well.67  In addition, the Homeland Security Department is looking to train 
additional American hackers to better understand the attacks from foreign hackers and to try to 
fight back.  Specialists believe that the United States would not fare well in a cyber attack, and 
                                                 
65
 Most agencies fail to follow security steps to stop e-mail phishing, retrieved 4/23/09, retrieved from 
http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20090417_4508.php 
 
 
66
 Hackers grabbed more than 285M records in 2008, retrieved 4/15/09, retrieved from 
http://tech.yahoo.com/news/ap/20090415/ap_on_hi_te/tec_techbit_data_breaches 
 
67
 Air Force building Cyber Command to thwart network attacks, retrieved 3/15/09, retrieved from 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/012308-elder-air-force-cyber-command.html?page=1 
 
 
  
59 
 
President Obama has asked for a 60 day review of all federal agencies on how they protect their 
data to determine the government’s role in helping them defend their networks.68  Many of the 
technologies that I described are not brand new and have been developing over many years, but 
many companies have still not taken the initiative and implemented these tools.  There are many 
users in the workforce who don’t understand or appreciate today’s threats.  If companies don’t 
start to act, we will continue to see the attacks on our networks and potentially something 
extremely vital to our nation will be compromised.  All of your information may already be on 
the Internet, so what are you going to do? 
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